William Poundstone's (2005) book, Fortune's Formula, brought the Kelly capital growth criterion to the attention of investors. But how do full Kelly and fractional Kelly strategies that blend with cash actually preform in practice? To investigate this we revisit three simple investment situations and simulate the behavior of these strategies over medium term horizons using a large number of scenarios. These examples are from Bicksler and Thorp (1973) and Ziemba and Hausch (1986) and we consider many more scenarios and strategies. The results show:
Introduction
In 1738 Daniel Bernoulli postulated that the marginal utility of an extra amount of money was proportional to the person's wealth. So u (w) = 1 w where u is the investor's utility function, primes denote derivatives and w is wealth. Integrating gives u(w) = log w. So log is the suggested utility function. Kelly (1956) and Latané (1959) argued that maximizing the expected utility with a log utility function is equivalent to the maximization of the long run growth rate. A derivation of this appears below. Breiman (1961) showed that the Kelly capital growth criterion had two long run properties. First, it maximizes the asymptotic long run growth rate. Secondly, it minimizes the time to achieve asymptotically large investment goals.
Discussion of various aspects of expected log maximization Kelly strategies and fractional Kelly strategies where one blends the Kelly strategy with cash are in the following papers: Browne (1998) , Hakansson and Ziemba (1995) , MacLean, Ziemba and Blazenko (1992) , MacLean, Ziemba and Li (2005) , McEnally (1986) , Merton and Samuelson (1974) , Mulvey, Pauling and Madey (2003) , Rubinstein (1976 Rubinstein ( , 1991 , Samuelson (1969 Samuelson ( , 1971 Samuelson ( , 1979 , Stutzer (2000 Stutzer ( , 2004 , Thorp (2006 Thorp ( , 2010 , Wilcox (2003ab, 2005 and Ziemba (2010) . Ziemba (2005) discusses the use of Kelly strategies by great investors such as Keynes, Buffett, Soros and others. Use of the Kelly strategies by Morningstar and Motley Fool are discussed by Fuller (2006) and Lee (2006) . They follow Poundstone (2005) and fail to understand the multivariate aspects of multiple assets, short term risk, transaction costs and other features of these strategies. The book MacLean, Thorp and Ziemba (2010a) provides a fuller analysis of the advantages and disadvantages, theory and practice of these strategies and additional references. The Kelly capital growth model in the simplest case is derived as follows:
The asymptotic rate of asset growth is
where w 0 is initial wealth and w N is period N's wealth. Consider Bernoulli trials that win +1 with probability p and lose −1 with probability 1 − p. If we win M out of N of these independent trials, then the wealth after period N is
where f is the fraction of our wealth bet in each period. Then
which by the strong law of large numbers is G(f ) = plog(1 + f ) + qlog(1 − f ) = E log(w).
Hence, the criterion of maximizing the long run exponential rate of asset growth is equivalent to maximizing the one period expected logarithm of wealth. So, to maximize long run (asymptotic) wealth maximizing expected log is the way to do it period by period. See MacLean, Thorp and Ziemba (2010a) for papers that generalize these simple Bernoulli trial asset return assumptions.
The optimal fractional bet, obtained by setting the derivative of G(f ) to zero, is f * = p − q which is simply the investor's edge or the expected gain on the bet. 1 If the bets are win O + 1 or lose 1, that is the odds are O to 1 to win, then the edge is pO − q and the optimal Kelly bet is f * = pO−q O or the edge odds . Since the edge pO − q is the measure of the mean and the odds is a risk concept, you wager more with higher mean and less with higher risk.
Observe that the bets can be very large. For example, if p = .99 and q = .01, the optimal bet is 98% of one's fortune! A real example of this by Mohnish Pabrai (2007) , who won the bidding for the 2008 lunch with Warren Buffett paying more than $600,000, had the following investment in Stewart Enterprises as discussed by Thorp (2010) . Over a 24-month period, with probability 0.80 the investment at least doubles, with 0.19 probability the investment breaks even and with 0.01 probability all the investment is lost. The optimal Kelly bet is 97.5% of wealth, half Kelly is 38.75%. Pabrai invested 10%. While this seems rather low, other investment opportunities, miscalculation of probabilities, risk tolerance, possible short run losses, bad scenario Black Swan events, price pressures, buying in and exiting suggest that a bet a lot lower than 97.5% is appropriate.
In general, Kelly bets are large and risky short term. One sees that from the Arrow-Pratt absolute risk aversion of the log utility criterion
which is essentially zero for non-bankrupt investors. Hence, log can be an exceedingly risky utility function with wide swings in wealth values because the optimal bets can be so large.
1 If there are two independent wagers and the size of the bets does not influence the odds, then an analytic expression can be derived, see Thorp (2006) . In general, to solve for the optimal wagers in cases where the bets influence the odds, there is dependence, or for cases with three or more wagers, one must solve a non-convex nonlinear program, see Ziemba and Hausch (1987) for techniques. This gives the optimal wager taking into account the effect of our bets on the odds (prices). Chopra and Ziemba (1993) investigated the effect of errors in mean, variance and covariance estimates in portfolio problems and show that the relative error impact is risk aversion dependent. For example, for typical problems there is a 20:2:1 ratio implying that errors in estimating the mean are ten times variance errors and twenty times co-variance errors in certainty equivalent value. But for log utility with extremely low risk aversion, this is more like 100:3:1. What's clear is that getting means correctly estimated is crucial for portfolio success.
Log utility is related to negative power utility, since with αw α for α < 0 since negative power converges to log when α → 0. So we can think of log as being the most risky and extreme negative power utility function. MacLean, Ziemba and Li (2005) have shown that the handy formula for the fraction f = 1 1−α is optimal when the asset returns are lognormal. Here k is the Kelly strategy and f xk is the fractional Kelly strategy. But, as Thorp (2010) has shown, this approximation can be poor if the assets are far from lognormal. Betting more than the Kelly amount leads to lower growth and more risk. That is linked to positive power utility which is to be avoided as it will invariably lead to disaster. See Ziemba and Ziemba (2007) for a discussion of some of these overbet disasters including LTCM, Niederhoffer and Amarath.
In continuous time, the long term optimal growth rate is
where µ is the mean portfolio return, r is the risk free return and σ 2 is the portfolio return variance. So the ordinary Sharpe ratio determines the optimal growth rate.
A very important question is how much of an investor's wealth should be allocated to investments including cash and other assets using the Kelly or fractional Kelly criterions. The capital growth literature has optimal dynamic consumption-investment models such as Phelps (1962) , Samuelson (1969) , Hakansson (1970 ), etc. Ziemba-Vickson (1975 and MacLean, Thorp and Ziemba (2010a) discuss many of these models.
One way to look at this is to assume that there is consumption (c) and discretionary wealth (w − c). Wilcox (2003) has studied this and notes that discretionary wealth can be written in terms of an implicit leverage ratio L = w w−c . The returns on risky assets are weighted or rescaled to reflect leveraging. The weighted return on a unit of capital invested is 1 + xLR where x and 1 − x are the fractions in risky assets and risk free assets, respectively, and R is the random rate of return on the risky asset portfolio. The standard Kelly problem is maxE R log(1 + xR) with Kelly optimal strategy weighting x * . Wilcox's modification is maxE log(1 + xLR). So if x w is a solution to this model -how does it relate to the Kelly weighting x * ? It is clear that x w = 1 L x * so the Wilcox discretionary portfolio is a fractional Kelly strategy. This is not surprising since fractional Kelly strategies are a blend of the Kelly weighting and cash. The higher L = w w−c is the lower is the optimal Kelly fraction. Wilcox discusses some implications of the impact of leverage. Higher leverage investors are sensitive to fat tails in the returns distribution and will reduce the Kelly fraction strategy. In this paper we analyze the returns at the end of 40 periods and other horizons and show wealth trajectories and how the Kelly fraction affects those trajectories.
Motivation for this paper
The Kelly optimal capital growth investment strategy has many attractive long run theoretical properties. MacLean, Thorp and Ziemba (2010b) discuss the good and bad properties. It has been dubbed "fortunes formula" by Thorp (see Poundstone, 2005) . However, the attractive long run properties are countered by negative short to medium term behavior based on conservative utility functions because of the almost zero Arrow-Pratt risk aversion of log utility. In this paper, the empirical performance of various Kelly and fractional Kelly strategies is considered in realistic investment situations. Three experiments from the literature Hausch, 1986 and Bicksler and Thorp, 1973) are more fully examined with many more scenarios and strategies. The class of investment strategies generated by varying the fraction of investment capital allocated to the Kelly portfolio are applied to simulated returns from the models, and the distribution of final wealth is described.
Fractional Kelly Strategies: The Ziemba and Hausch Experiment
Consider an investment situation with five possible independent investments where one wagers $1 and either loses it with probability 1 − p or wins $ (O + 1) with probability p, with odds 0 to 1. The five wagers with odds of O = 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 to one all have the same expected value of 1.14. The optimal Kelly wagers in the one dimensional case are the expected value edge of 14% over the odds. Hence the wagers are from 14%, down to 2.8% of initial and current wealth at each decision point for the five investments. Table 1 describes these investments. The value 1.14 was chosen as it is the recommended cutoff for profitable place and show racing bets using the system described in Ziemba and Hausch (1986) . Ziemba and Hausch (1986) used 700 decision points and 1000 scenarios and compared full with half Kelly strategies. We use the same 700 decision points and 2000 scenarios and calculate more attributes of the various strategies. We use full, 3/4, 1/2, 1/4, and 1/8 Kelly strategies and compute the maximum, mean, minimum, standard deviation, skewness, excess kurtosis and the number out of the 2000 scenarios for which the final wealth starting from an initial wealth of $1000 is more than $50, $100, $500 (lose less than half), $1000 (breakeven), $10,000 (more than 10-fold), $100,000 (more than 100-fold), and $1 million (more than a thousand-fold). Figure 1 shows the wealth paths of these maximum final wealth levels. Most of the gain is in the final 100 of the 700 decision points. Even with these maximum graphs, there is much volatility in the final wealth with the amount of volatility generally higher with higher Kelly fractions. Indeed with 3/4 Kelly, there were losses from about decision points 610 to 670. Considering the chance of losses (final wealth is less than the initial $1000) in all cases, even with 1/8 Kelly with 1.1% and 1/4 Kelly with 2.15%, there are losses with 700 independent bets each with an edge of 14%. For full Kelly, it is fully 12.4% losses, and it is 7.25% with 3/4 Kelly and 3.5% with half Kelly. These are just the percent of losses. But the size of the losses can be large as shown in the > 50, > 100, and > 500 rows of Table 2 . The minimum final wealth levels were 587 for 1/8 and 513 for 1/4 Kelly so you never lose more than half your initial wealth with these lower risk betting strategies. But with 1/2, 3/4 and full Kelly, the minimums were 111, 56, and only $4. Figure 2 shows these minimum wealth paths. With full Kelly, and by inference 1/8, 1/4, 1/2, and 3/4 Kelly, the investor can actually never go fully bankrupt because of the proportional nature of Kelly betting.
If capital is infinitely divisible and there is no leveraging, then the Kelly bettor cannot go bankrupt since one never bets everything (unless the probability of losing anything at all is zero and the probability of winning is positive). If capital is discrete, then presumably Kelly bets are rounded down to avoid overbetting, in which case, at least one unit is never bet. Hence, the worst case with Kelly is to be reduced to one unit, at which point betting stops. Since fractional Kelly bets less, the result follows for all such strategies. For levered wagers, that is, betting more than one's wealth with borrowed money, the investor can lose more than their initial wealth and become bankrupt.
Proportional Investment Strategies: Alternative Experiments
The growth and risk characteristics for proportional investment strategies such as the Kelly depend upon the returns on risky investments. We now consider two other investment experiments where the return distributions are quite different. The mean returns are similar: 14% for Ziemba-Hausch, 12.5% for Bicksler-Thorp Example I, and 10.2% for Bicksler-Thorp Example II. However, the variation around the mean is not similar and this produces much different Kelly strategies and corresponding wealth trajectories for scenarios. The third experiment involves two assets: risky stock and safe cash which can be levered to produce considerable losses as well as large gains.
The Ziemba and Hausch Model
The first experiment looks further at the Ziemba and Hausch (1986) model. A simulation was performed with 3000 scenarios over T = 40 decision points with the five types of independent investments for various investment strategies. The Kelly fractions and the proportion of wealth invested are in Table 3 . Here, 1.0k is full Kelly, the strategy which maximizes the expected logarithm of wealth. Values below 1.0 are fractional Kelly and coincide approximately with the decision from using a negative power utility function. The approximation f = 1 1−α , where f xk is the fractional Kelly strategy and α < 0 is from the negative power utility function αw α , is exactly correct for lognormally distributed assets and approximately correct otherwise, see MacLean, Ziemba and Li (2005) for proof. But the approximation can be poor for asset distributions far from log normal; see Thorp (2010) . Values above 1.0 coincide with those from some positive power utility function. This is overbetting according to MacLean, Ziemba and Blazenko (1992) , because the long run growth rate falls and security (measured by the chance of reaching a specific positive goal before falling to a negative growth level) also falls. This is very important and not fully understood by many hedge fund and other investors. Long Term Capital's 1998 demise from overbetting is a prime example. Examples of other similar blowouts are discussed in Ziemba and Ziemba (2007) . They argue that the recipe for hedge fund disaster is almost always the same: the portfolio is overbet and not well diversified in some scenarios and then a bad scenario occurs in a non-diversified part of the portfolio and disaster quickly follows. The trouble is that the penalty for losses, especially with large portfolios in the billions is way too low. Fees are kept and fired traders either retire or get rehired by other funds. Examples include John Merriwether, Victor Niederhoffer and Brian Hunter. The initial wealth for investment was 1000. Since the Kelly bets are small, the proportion of current wealth invested is not high for any of the fractions. The upside and down side are not dramatic in this example, although there is a substantial gap between the maximum and minimum wealth with the highest fraction. Figure 3 shows the trajectories which have the highest and lowest final wealth for a selection of fractions. The log-wealth is displayed to show the rate of growth at each decision point. The lowest trajectories are almost a reflection of the highest ones.
The skewness and kurtosis indicate that final wealth is not normally distributed. This is expected since the geometric growth process suggests a log-normal wealth. Figure 4 displays the simulated log-wealth for selected fractions at the horizon T = 40. The normal probability plot will be linear if terminal wealth is distributed log-normally. The slope of the plot captures the shape of the log-wealth distribution. For this example the final wealth distribution is close to log-normal. As the Kelly fraction increases the slope increases, showing the longer right tail but also the increase in downside risk in the wealth distribution.
On the inverse cumulative distribution plot, the initial wealth ln(1000) = 6.91 is indicated to show the chance of losses. And indeed there can be considerable losses as shown in the left side of Figure 4a . The inverse cumulative distribution of log-wealth is the basis of comparisons of accumulated wealth at the horizon. In particular, if the plots intersect then first order stochastic dominance by a wealth distribution does not exist (Hanoch and Levy, 1969) . The mean and standard deviation of log-wealth are considered in Figure 5 , where the growth versus security trade-off by Kelly fraction is shown. The mean log-wealth peaks at the full Kelly strategy whereas the standard deviation is monotone increasing. Fractional strategies greater than full Kelly are inefficient in log-wealth, since the growth rate decreases and the standard deviation of log-wealth increases. It is these where the hedge fund disasters occur.
We have the following conclusions:
1. The statistics describing end of horizon (T = 40) wealth are all monotone in the fraction of wealth invested in the Kelly portfolio. The maximum terminal wealth and the mean terminal wealth increase in the Kelly fraction. In contrast the minimum wealth decreases as the fraction increases and the standard deviation grows as the fraction increases. There is a trade-off between wealth growth and risk. The cumulative distributions in Figure 4 supports the theory for fractional strategies, as there is no dominance, and the distribution plots all intersect.
2. The maximum and minimum final wealth trajectories show the wealth growth -risk trade-off of the strategies. The worst scenario is the same for all Kelly fractions so that the wealth decay is greater with higher fractions. The best scenario differs for the low fraction strategies, but the growth path is almost monotone in the fraction. The mean-standard deviation trade-off demonstrates the inefficiency of levered strategies (greater than full Kelly) which, as shown, are growth-security dominated and to be avoided in practice by responsible traders. 
Bicksler and Thorp Example I -Uniform Returns
There is one risky asset R with mean return of +12.5%, that is uniformly distributed between -25% and +50% for each dollar invested. Assume we can lend or borrow capital at a risk free rate r = 0.0. Let λ be the proportion of capital invested in the risky asset, where λ ranges from 0.4 to 2.4. So λ = 2.4 means $1.4 is borrowed for each $1 of current wealth and $2.40 is invested in the risky asset. The Kelly optimal growth investment in the risky asset is x = 2.8655. The Kelly fractions for the different values of λ are shown in The numerical results from the simulation with T = 40 are in Tables 6 -8 . Although the Kelly investment is levered, the fractions in this case are less than 1.
In this experiment the Kelly proportion is high, based on the attractiveness of the investment in stock. The largest fraction (0.838k) has high returns, although in the worst scenario most of the wealth is lost. The trajectories for the highest and lowest terminal wealth scenarios are displayed in Figure 6 . The highest rate of growth is for the highest fraction, and correspondingly it has the largest wealth fallback.
The distribution of terminal wealth in Figure 7 illustrates the growth of the f = 0.838k strategy. It intersects the normal probability plot for other strategies very early and increases its advantage. The linearity of the plots for all strategies is evidence of the lognormality of final wealth. The inverse cumulative distribution plot indicates that the chance of losses is small -the horizontal line indicates the log of initial wealth.
As further evidence of the superiority of the f = 0.838k strategy consider the mean and standard deviation of log-wealth in Figure 8 . The growth rate (mean ln(Wealth)) continues to increase since the fractional strategies are less then full Kelly. So there is no more than full Kelly over betting in this strategy.
2 The formula relating λ and f for this experiment is as follows. For the problem
where R is uniform on [a, b] and r =the risk free rate. The first order condition
reduces to We have the following conclusions:
1. The statistics describing end of horizon (T = 40) wealth are again monotone in the fraction of wealth invested in the Kelly portfolio. Specifically the maximum terminal wealth and the mean terminal wealth increase in the Kelly fraction. In contrast the minimum wealth decreases as the fraction increases and the standard deviation grows as the fraction increases. The growth and decay are much more pronounced then was the case in experiment 1. The minimum still remains above 0 since the fraction of Kelly is less than 1. There is a trade-off between wealth growth and risk, but the advantage of leveraged investment is clear. As illustrated with the cumulative distributions in Figure 7 , the log-normality holds and the upside growth is more pronounced than the downside loss. Of course, the fractions are less than 1 so improved growth is expected.
2. The maximum and minimum final wealth trajectories clearly show the wealth growth -risk of various strategies. The mean-standard deviation trade-off favors the largest fraction, even though it is highly levered.
Bicksler -Thorp Example II -Equity versus Cash
In the third experiment there are two assets: US equities and US T-bills. According to Siegel (2002) , during 1926-2001 US equities returned 10.2% with a yearly standard deviation of 20.3%, and the mean return was 3.9% for short term government T-bills with zero standard deviation. We assume the choice is between these two assets in each period. The Kelly strategy is to invest a proportion of wealth x = 1.5288 in equities and sell short the T-bill at 1 − x = −0.5228 of current wealth. With the short selling and levered strategies, there is a chance of substantial losses. For the simulations, the proportion: λ of wealth invested in equities 3 and the corresponding Kelly fraction f are provided in Table  7 . Bicksler and Thorp used 10 and 20 yearly decision periods, and 50 simulated scenarios. We use 40 yearly decision periods, with 3000 scenarios.
The results from the simulations with experiment 3 appear in Tables 8 -11 . The striking aspects of the statistics in Table 8 are the sizable gains and losses. For the most aggressive 3 The formula relating λ and f for this example is as follows. For the problem
where R is assumed to be Gaussian with mean µR and standard deviation σR, and r =the risk free rate. The solution is given by Merton (1990) as
Since µR = 0.102, σR = 0.203, r = 0.039, the Kelly strategy is x = 1.5288.
λ 0.4 0.8 1.2 1.6 2.0 2.4 f 0.26 0.52 0.78 1.05 1.31 1.57 Table 7 : Kelly Fractions for the Bicksler and Thorp (1973) Example II strategy (1.57k), it is possible to lose 10,000 times the initial wealth. This assumes that the shortselling is permissable through to the decision period at the horizon T=40. The highest and lowest final wealth trajectories are presented in Figure 9 . In the worst case, the trajectory is terminated to indicate the timing of vanishing wealth. There is quick bankruptcy for the aggressive strategies.
The substantial downside is further illustrated in the distribution of final wealth plot in Figure 10 . The normal probability plots are almost linear on the upside (log-normality), but the downside is much more extreme than log-normal for all strategies except for 0.52k. Even the full Kelly is very risky in this example largely because the basic position is levered. The inverse cumulative distribution shows a high probability of large losses with the most aggressive strategies. In constructing these plots the negative growth was incorporated with the formula growth = [signW T ] ln(|W T |).
The mean-standard deviation trade-off in Figure 11 provides more evidence concerning the riskyness of the high proportion strategies. When the fraction exceeds the full Kelly, the drop-off in growth rate is sharp, and that is matched by a sharp increase in standard The results in experiment 3 lead to the following conclusions.
1. The statistics describing the end of the horizon (T = 40) wealth are again monotone in the fraction of wealth invested in the Kelly portfolio. Specifically (i) the maximum terminal wealth and the mean terminal wealth increase in the Kelly fraction; and (ii) the minimum wealth decreases as the fraction increases and the standard deviation grows as the fraction increases. The growth and decay are pronounced and it is possible to have extremely large losses. The fraction of the Kelly optimal growth strategy exceeds 1 in the most levered strategies and this is very risky. There is a trade-off between return and risk, but the mean for the levered strategies is growing far less than the standard deviation. The disadvantage of leveraged investment is illustrated with the cumulative distributions in Figure 10 . The log-normality of final wealth does not hold for the levered strategies.
2. The maximum and minimum final wealth trajectories show the return -risk of levered strategies. The worst and best scenarios are not same for all Kelly fractions. The worst scenario for the most levered strategy shows the rapid decline in wealth. The mean-standard deviation trade-off confirms the extreme riskyness of the aggressive strategies.
Final Comments
The Kelly optimal capital growth investment strategy is an attractive approach to wealth creation. In addition to maximizing the asymptotic rate of long term growth of capital, it avoids bankruptcy and overwhelms any essentially different investment strategy in the long run. See MacLean, Thorp and Ziemba (2010b) for a discussion of the good and bad properties of these strategies. However, automatic use of the Kelly strategy in any investment situation is risky and can be dangerous. It requires some adaptation to the investment environment: rates of return, volatilities, correlation of alternative assets, estimation error, risk aversion preferences, and planning horizon are all important aspects of the investment process. Poundstone's (2005) book, while a very good read, does not explain these important investment aspects and the use of Kelly strategies by advisory firms such as Morningstar and Motley Fools is flawed. The experiments in this paper represent some of the diversity in the investment environment. By considering the Kelly and its variants we get a concrete look at the plusses and minusses of the capital growth model. The main points from the Bicksler and Thorp (1973) and Ziemba and Hausch (1986) studies are confirmed.
• The wealth accumulated from the full Kelly strategy does not stochastically dominate fractional Kelly wealth. The downside is often much more favorable with a fraction less than one.
• There is a tradeoff of risk and return with the fraction invested in the Kelly portfolio. In cases of large uncertainty, either from intrinsic volatility or estimation error, security is gained by reducing the Kelly investment fraction.
• The full Kelly strategy can be highly levered. While the use of borrowing can be effective in generating large returns on investment, increased leveraging beyond the full Kelly is not warranted as it is growth-security dominated. The returns from over-levered investment are offset by a growing probability of bankruptcy.
• The Kelly strategy is not merely a long term approach. Proper use in the short and medium run can achieve wealth goals while protecting against drawdowns. MacLean, Sanegre, Zhao and Ziemba (2004) and MacLean, Zhao and Ziemba (2009) discuss a strategy to reduce the Kelly fraction to stay above a prespecified wealth path with high probability.
The great economist Paul Samuelson was a long time critic of the Kelly strategy which maximizes the expected logarithm of final wealth, see, for example, Samuelson (1969 Samuelson ( , 1971 Samuelson ( , 1979 and Merton and Samuelson (1974) . His criticisms are well dealt with in this simulation paper and we see no disagreement with his various analytic points:
1. the Kelly strategy maximizes the asymptotic long run growth of the investor's wealth, and we agree;
2. the Kelly strategy maximizes expected utility of only logarithmic utility and not necessarily any other utility function, and we agree; and 3. the Kelly strategy always leads to more wealth than any essentially different strategy; this we know from this paper is not true since it is possible to have a large number of very good investments and still lose most of one's fortune.
Samuelson seemed to imply that Kelly proponents thought that the Kelly strategy maximizes for other utility functions but this was neither argued nor implied.
It is true that the expected value of wealth is higher with the Kelly strategy but bad outcomes are very possible.
In correspondence with Ziemba (private correspondence, 2006 Ziemba (private correspondence, , 2007 Ziemba (private correspondence, , 2008 he seems to feel that half Kelly or u(w) = − 1 w explains the data better. We agree that in practice, half Kelly is a toned down version of full Kelly that provides a lot more security to compensate for its loss in long term growth. Samuelson proposes an analysis of three investors − 1 w , log w and w 1 2 . In Ziemba (2010) these are explored adding two tail investors αw α , α → −∞ the safest investor and w, namely α = 1, the riskiest investor which span the range of absolute Arrow-Pratt risk aversion from 0 to ∞.
